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Abstract—We determine the capacity region of the secure
multiplex coding with a common message, and evaluate the
mutual information and the equivocation rate of a collection
of secret messages to the second receiver (eavesdropper), which
were not evaluated by Yamamoto et al.
Index Terms—broadcast channel with confidential messages,
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I. Introduction
The information theoretic security attracts much attention
recently [11], because it offers security that does not depend on
a conjectured difficulty of some computational problem. One
of most fundamental problems in the information theoretic
security is coding for the wiretap channel considered by
Wyner [14]. Later it was generalized to the broadcast channel
with confidential messages (hereafter abbreviated as BCC) by
Csiszár and Körner [4], in which there is a single sender called
Alice and two receivers called Bob and Eve. In the formulation
in [4], Alice has a common messages destined for both Bob
and Eve and a private message destined solely for Bob. The
word “confidential” means that Alice wants to prevent Eve
from knowing much about the private message. The wiretap
channel corresponds to BCC without the common message.
The coding in these situations has two goals, namely error
correction and secrecy.
The secrecy is realized by including random bits statistically
independent of the secret message into the transmitted signal
by Alice so that the secret message becomes ambiguous to
Eve. The inclusion of random bits, of course, decreases the
information rate. In order to get rid of the decrease in the
information rate, Yamamoto et al. [8] proposed the secure
multiplex coding, in which there is no loss of information rate.
The idea of Yamamoto et al. is as follows. Suppose that Alice
has T statistically independent messages S 1, . . . , S T . Then S 1,
. . . , S i−1, S i+1, . . . , S T serve as the random bits making S i
ambiguous to Eve, for each i. However, there are three rooms
for improvement in Yamamoto et al. [8] as follows: (1) Let Z
be Eve’s received signal. Yamamoto et al. [8] proved that the
mutual information I(S i; Z) can be made arbitrary small for
each i, but they did not evaluate I(S I; Z), where S I denotes
the collection of secret messages (S i : i ∈ I). (2) They did not
evaluate the equivocation rate when the information rates of
secret messages are large. (3) Their coding scheme [8] cannot
support a common message to both Bob and Eve as done by
Csiszár and Körner [4].
In this paper, we shall present a coding scheme for the
secure multiplex coding that uses the privacy amplification
technique and that can support a common message to both Bob
and Eve. We evaluate the mutual information for collections
of secret messages (S i : i ∈ I) for all ∅ , I ⊆ {1, . . . , T }. We
also clarify the convergence speed of the mutual information
to the infinity when the information rates of secret messages
are large. The coding scheme in this paper is similar to the
privacy amplification based scheme with the strong secrecy
for BCC [12], but it differs in the following: Let F be a
random variable of bijection from S 1, . . . , S T to themselves.
In order to apply the privacy amplification theorem to S 1, . . . ,
S T simultaneously, the correspondence between F(S 1, . . . , S T )
and S i has to be the two-universal hashing [3] for each i = 1,
. . . , T . We shall also present how to construct such F.
This paper is organized as follows: Section II reviews
relevant research results used in this paper. Section III intro-
duces the strengthened version of the privacy amplification
theorem, then defines and proves the capacity region of the
secure multiplex coding with a common message, by using
the strengthened privacy amplification theorem. Section IV
presents constructions of the bijection F described in the
previous paragraph. Section V concludes the paper.
II. Preliminary
A. Broadcast channels with confidential messages
Let Alice, Bob, and Eve be as defined in Section I. X
denotes the channel input alphabet and Y (resp. Z) denotes
the channel output alphabet to Bob (resp. Eve). We assume
that X, Y, and Z are finite unless otherwise stated. We shall
discuss the continuous channel briefly in Remark 13. We
denote the conditional probability of the channel to Bob (resp.
Eve) by PY |X (resp. PZ|X). The set Sn denotes that of the
private message and En does that of the common message
when the block coding of length n is used. We shall define
the achievability of a rate triple (R1, Re, R0). For the notational
convenience, we fix the base of logarithm, including one used
in entropy and mutual information, to the base of natural
logarithm. The privacy amplification theorem introduced in
Theorem 5 is sensitive to choice of the base of logarithm.
Definition 1: The rate triple (R1, Re, R0) is said to be
achievable if there exists a sequence of Alice’s stochastic
encoder fn from Sn × En to Xn, Bob’s deterministic decoder
ϕn : Y
n → Sn×En and Eve’s deterministic decoder ψn : Zn →
1
En such that
lim
n→∞
Pr[(S n, En) , ϕn(Yn) or En , ψn(Zn)] = 0,
lim inf
n→∞
H(S n|Zn)
n
≥ Re,
lim inf
n→∞
log |Sn|
n
≥ R1,
lim inf
n→∞
log |En|
n
≥ R0,
where S n and En represents the secret and the common
message, respectively, have the uniform distribution on Sn
and En, respectively, and Yn and Zn are the received signal
by Bob and Eve, respectively, with the transmitted signal
fn(S n, En) and the channel transition probabilities PY |X , PZ|X .
The capacity region of the BCC is the closure of the achievable
rate triples.
Theorem 2: [4] The capacity region for the BCC is given
by the set of R0, R1 and Re such that there exists a Markov
chain U → V → X → YZ and
R1 + R0 ≤ I(V; Y |U) + min[I(U; Y), I(U; Z)],
R0 ≤ min[I(U; Y), I(U; Z)],
Re ≤ I(V; Y |U) − I(V; Z|U),
Re ≤ R1.
As described in [11], U can be regarded as the common
message, V the combination of the common and the private
messages, and X the transmitted signal.
B. Broadcast channels with degraded message sets
If we set Re = 0 in the BCC, the secrecy requirement is
removed from BCC, and the coding problem is equivalent to
the broadcast channel with degraded message sets (abbreviated
as BCD) considered by Körner and Marton [9].
Corollary 3: The capacity region of the BCD is given by
the set of R0 and R′1 such that there exists a Markov chain
U → V = X → YZ and
R0 ≤ min[I(U; Y), I(U; Z)],
R0 + R′1 ≤ I(V; Y |U) + min[I(U; Y), I(U; Z)].
One of several typical proofs for the direct part of BCD is as
follows [2]: Given PUV , R0, R′1, we randomly choose exp(nR0)
codewords of length n according to PnU , and for each created
codeword un, randomly choose exp(nR′1) codewords of length
n according to PnV |U(·|un). Over the constructed ensemble of
codebooks, we calculate the average decoding probability
by the joint typical decoding, or the maximum likelihood
decoding, etc.
C. Two-universal hash functions
We shall use a family of two-universal hash functions [3]
for the privacy amplification theorem introduced later.
Definition 4: Let F be a set of functions from S1 to S2,
and F the not necessarily uniform random variable on F . If
for any x1 , x2 ∈ S1 we have
Pr[F(x1) = F(x2)] ≤ 1
|S2|
,
then F is said to be a family of two-universal hash functions.
III. Secure multiplex coding with a common message
A. Strengthened privacy amplification theorem
In order to analyze the equivocation rate, we need to
strengthen the privacy amplification theorem originally ap-
peared in [1], [6].
Theorem 5: (Extension of [6]) Let L be a random variable
with a finite alphabet L and Z any random variable. Let F be
a family of two-universal hash functions from L to M, and
F be a random variable on F statistically independent of L.
Then
E f exp(ρI(F(L); Z|F = f )) ≤ 1 + |M|ρE[PL|Z(L|Z)ρ] (1)
for 0 < ρ ≤ 1. If Z is not discrete RV, I(F(L); Z|F) is defined
to be H(F(L)|F) − EzH(F(L)|F, Z = z).
In addition to the above assumptions, when L is uniformly
distributed, we have
|M|ρE[PL|Z(L|Z)ρ] =
|M|ρE[PL|Z(L|Z)ρPL(L)−ρ]
|L|ρ
. (2)
In addition to all of the above assumptions, when Z is a
discrete random variable, we have
|M|ρE[PL|Z(L|Z)ρPL(L)−ρ]
|L|ρ
=
|M|ρ
|L|ρ
∑
z,ℓ
PL(ℓ)PZ|L(z|ℓ)1+ρPZ(z)−ρ.
(3)
Proof. See [13, Appendix].
Remark 6: It was assumed that Z was discrete in [13].
However, when the alphabet of L is finite, there is no difficulty
to extend the original result.
As in [6] we introduce the following two functions.
Definition 7:
ψ(ρ, PZ|L, PL) = log
∑
z
∑
ℓ
PL(ℓ)PZ|L(z|ℓ)1+ρPZ(z)−ρ, (4)
φ(ρ, PZ|L, PL) = log
∑
z
∑
ℓ
PL(ℓ)(PZ|L(z|ℓ)1/(1−ρ))

1−ρ
.(5)
Observe that φ is essentially Gallager’s function E0 [5].
Proposition 8: [5], [6] exp(φ(ρ, PZ|L, PL)) is concave with
respect to PL with fixed 0 < ρ < 1 and PZ|L. For fixed 0 < ρ <
1, PL and PZ|L we have
exp(ψ(ρ, PZ|L, PL)) ≤ exp(φ(ρ, PZ|L, PL)). (6)
B. Capacity region of the secure multiplex coding
Definition 9: The rate tuple (R0, R1, . . . , RT ) and the
equivocation rate tuple {Re,I | ∅ , I ⊆ {1, . . . , T }} are
said to be achievable for the secure multiplex coding with T
secret messages if there exists a sequence of Alice’s stochastic
encoder fn from S1,n×· · ·×ST,n×En to Xn, Bob’s deterministic
decoder ϕn : Yn → S1,n×· · ·×ST,n×En and Eve’s deterministic
decoder ψn : Zn → En such that
lim
n→∞
Pr[(S 1,n, . . . , S T,n, En) , ϕn(Yn) or
En , ψn(Zn)] = 0,
2
lim
n→∞
I(S I,n; Zn) = 0
(
if Re,I =
∑
i∈I
Ri
)
,
lim inf
n→∞
H(S I,n|Zn)/n ≥ Re,I,
lim inf
n→∞
log |Si,n|
n
≥ Ri,
lim inf
n→∞
log |En|
n
≥ R0,
for i = 1, . . . , T , where S i,n and En represent the i-th secret
and the common message, respectively, S i,n and En have the
uniform distribution on Si,n and En, respectively, S I,n is the
collection of random variables S i,n with i ∈ I, and Yn and
Zn are the received signal by Bob and Eve, respectively, with
the transmitted signal fn(S 1,n, . . . , S T,n, En) and the channel
transition probabilities PY |X , PZ|X . The capacity region of the
secure multiplex coding is the closure of the achievable rate
tuples.
Theorem 10: The capacity region for the secure multiplex
coding with a common message is given by the set of R0, R1,
. . . , RT and {Re,I | ∅ , I ⊆ {1, . . . , T }} such that there exists
a Markov chain U → V → X → YZ and
R0 ≤ min[I(U; Y), I(U; Z)],
T∑
i=0
Ri ≤ I(V; Y |U) + min[I(U; Y), I(U; Z)]
Re,I ≤ I(V; Y |U) − I(V; Z|U) for all ∅ , I ⊆ {1, . . . , T },
Re,I ≤
∑
i∈I
Ri.
Proof. The converse part of this coding theorem follows from
that for Theorem 2. We have to show the direct part.
Let Si,n be the message set of the i-th secret message, and
S I,n = (S i,n : i ∈ I). Let the RV Bn on Bn denote the
private message to Bob without secrecy requirement, En on
En the common message to both Bob and Eve. Without loss
of generality we may assume that Bn =
∏T+1
i=1 Si,n, where the
set ST+1 is the alphabet of randomness used by the stochastic
encoder, and n denotes the code length. (S 1,n, . . . , S T,n, S T+1,n)
is assumed to be uniformly distributed, which implies the
statistical independence of (S 1,n, . . . , S T,n, S T+1,n). In Section
IV we shall prove the existence of a set Fn of bijective maps
from Bn to itself such that if Fn is the uniform random variable
on Fn then αI ◦Fn is a family of two-universal hash functions
from Bn to Si,n for all ∅ , I ⊆ {1, . . . , T }, where αI is the
projection from Bn to ∏i∈I Si,n.
Let Λ be an RV indicating selection of codebook in the
random ensemble constructed in the way reviewed in Section
II-B, Un = Λ(En) on Un and Vn = Λ(Bn, En) on Vn
codewords for the BCD taking the random selection Λ taking
into account, and Zn Eve’s received signal.
The structure of the transmitter and the receiver is as
follows: Fix a bijective function fn ∈ Fn and Alice and Bob
agree on the choice of fn. Given T secret messages s1,n,
. . . , sT,n, choose sT+1,n uniformly randomly from ST+1, treat
bn = f −1n (s1,n, . . . , sT,n, sT+1,n) as the private message to Bob,
encode bn along with the common message en by an encoder
for the BCD, and get a codeword vn. Apply the artificial noise
to vn according to the conditional probability distribution PnX |V
and get the transmitted signal xn. Bob decodes the received
signal and get bn, then apply fn to bn to get (s1,n, . . . , sT,n). This
construction requires Alice and Bob to agree on the choice of
fn. We shall show that there exists at least one fn that meets
the requirements of secure multiplex coding.
Define B′n = F−1n (S 1,n, . . . , S T,n, S T+1,n). We want to apply
the privacy amplification theorem to I(αI(Fn(B′n)); Zn|Fn) for
an arbitrary fixed ∅ , I ⊆ {1, . . . , T }. To use the theorem we
must ensure independence of Fn and B′n. Since the conditional
distribution of B′n is always uniform regardless of the realiza-
tion of Fn, we can see that Fn and B′n are independent. It
also follows that B′n is uniformly distributed over Bn. Denote
B′n by Bn. The remaining task is to find an upper bound on
I(αI(Fn(Bn)); Zn|Fn,Λ). Since the decoding error probability
of the above scheme is not greater than that of the code for
BCD, we do not have to analyze the decoding error probability.
Firstly, we consider E fn exp(ρI(αI(Fn(Bn)); Zn|Fn = fn, Λ =
λ)) with fixed selection λ of Λ. In the following analysis, we
do not make any assumption on the probability distribution of
En except that S 1,n, . . . , S T+1,n, En, Fn and Λ are statistically
independent.
By the almost same argument as [12] with use of Eq. (1),
we can see
E fn exp(ρI(αI(Fn(Bn)); Zn|Fn = fn,Λ = λ))
≤ E fn exp(ρI(αI((Fn(Bn)); Zn, En|Fn = fn,Λ = λ))
(Giving the common message En does not increase I much.)
= E fn exp(ρ
∑
e
PEn (e)I(αI(Fn(Bn)); Zn|Fn = fn, En = e,Λ = λ))
≤ E fn
∑
e
PEn (e) exp(ρI(αI(Fn(Bn)); Zn|Fn = fn, En = e,Λ = λ))
≤ 1 +
∑
e
PEn (e)
exp(nρRI)
exp(nρRp)
∑
b,z
PBn(b)PZn|Bn,En ,Λ=λ(z|b, e)1+ρ
PZn |En=e,Λ=λ(z)−ρ (by Eqs. (1–3))
= 1 +
∑
e
PEn (e) exp(nρ(RI − Rp) + ψ(ρ, PZn |Vn , PVn|En=e,Λ=λ))
(by [12] and Eq. (4)),
≤ 1 +
∑
e
PEn (e) exp(nρ(RI − Rp) + φ(ρ, PZn|Vn , PVn|En=e,Λ=λ))
(by Eq. (6))
where
RI =
∑
i∈I log |Si,n|
n
, (7)
Rp =
log |Bn|
n
. (8)
We shall average the above upper bound over Λ. By the
almost same argument as [12], we can see
exp(ρE fn,λ
∑
e
PEn (e)I(αI(Fn(Bn)); Zn|Fn = fn,Λ = λ, En = e))
(9)
3
≤ E fn,λ exp(ρ
∑
e
PEn (e)I(αI(Fn(Bn)); Zn|
Fn = fn,Λ = λ, En = e))
= 1 +
exp(ρ(RI − Rp))

∑
u∈U
PU(u) exp(φ(ρ, PZ|V , PV |U=u))


n
.
(10)
Taking the logarithm of Eqs. (9) and (10) we can see
I(αI(Fn(Bn)); Zn, En|Fn,Λ))
= I(αI(Fn(Bn)); Zn|Fn,Λ, En))
≤
1
ρ
log{1 + [exp(ρ(RI − Rp))
∑
u∈U
PU(u) exp(φ(ρ, PZ|V , PV |U=u))
]n}
≤
1
ρ
exp(ρ(RI − Rp))

∑
u∈U
PU(u) exp(φ(ρ, PZ|V , PV |U=u))


n
(11)
We shall consider the limit of the above upper bound. Taking
the logarithm of the upper bound (11) we have
− log ρ + nρ
×
[
RI − Rp +
1
ρ
log
(∑
u∈U
PU(u) exp(φ(ρ, PZ|V , PV |U=u))
)
︸                                               ︷︷                                               ︸
(∗)
]
.
We can see that (*) → I(V; Z|U) as ρ → 0 by applying the
l’Hôpital’s rule to (*).
Set the size of Bn as
log |Bn|
n
= Rp = I(V; Y |U) − δ
with δ > 0 such that
RI − Re,I > RI − Rp + I(V; Z|U) (12)
for all ∅ , I ⊆ {1, . . . , T }. Then by Eq. (11), we can see that
there exists ǫn → 0(n → ∞) such that
I(S I; Zn|Fn,Λ) ≤ ǫn (13)
if RI = Re,I. On the other hand, when RI > Re,I, by Eq. (10),
we have
E fn,λ exp(ρI(S I; Zn|Fn = fn,Λ = λ))
≤ 1 + exp(nρ(RI − Rp + I(V; Z|U) + ǫ(ρ))), (14)
where ǫ(ρ) → 0(ρ → 0). Let δn be the decoding error
probability of the underling channel code for BCD. Then, by
the almost same argument as [13], there exists at least one
pair of ( fn, λ) such that
I(S I; Zn|Fn,Λ) < 2 · 2T ǫn (if RI = Re,I),
exp(ρI(S I; Zn|Fn = fn,Λ = λ)) ≤ 2 · 2T [1 + exp(nρ(RI − Rp+
I(V; Z|U) + ǫ(ρ)))], (15)
decoding error probability ≤ 2 · 2Tδn.
By Eq. (15) we can see
I(S I; Zn|Fn = fn,Λ = λ)
n
≤
1 + log(2 · 2T )
nρ
+ RI − Rp
+ I(V; Z|U) + ǫ(ρ). (16)
for RI − Rp + I(V; Z|U) + ǫ(ρ) ≥ 0, where we used log(1 +
exp(x)) ≤ 1 + x for x ≥ 0. By Eqs. (12) and (16) we can see
that the equivocation rate H(S I|Zn, Fn = fn,Λ = λ)/n becomes
larger than the required value Re,I for sufficiently large n. This
completes the analysis of the equivocation rates and the mutual
information for all ∅ , I ⊆ {1, . . . , T }.
Remark 11: Our proof does not require the common mes-
sage En to be decoded by Bob. Our technique can provide an
upper bound on the mutual information of S I to Eve even
when En is a private message to Eve.
Remark 12: The (negative) exponential decreasing rate of
the mutual information in our argument is
ρ(RI − Rp) + log

∑
u,v,z
PUVZ (u, v, z)PZ|V(z|v)ρPZ|U(z|u)−ρ
 (17)
when Re,I = RI. Minimizing the above expression over
0 < ρ ≤ 1, Rp and U → V → X → YZ such that
R0 ≤ min{I(U; Y), I(U; Z)} and Rp ≤ I(V; Y |U) gives the
smallest negative exponent. From the form of the mathematical
expression, increase in Rp decreases the mutual information
and increases the decoding error probability of the secret mes-
sage to Bob. This suggests that the optimal mutual information
and the optimal decoding error probability cannot be realized
simultaneously. We note that the exponent (17) is the same as
one given by Yamamoto et al. [8] when there is no common
message.
Remark 13: We can easily carry over our proof to the case
of the channel being Gaussian, because
• we can extend Eq. (3) to the Gaussian case just by
replacing the probability mass functions PZ|L and PZ by
their probability density functions.
• the random codebook Λ obeys the multidimensional
Gaussian distribution,
• the concavity of φ is retained when its second argument
is conditional probability density,
• and the all mathematical manipulations in this section
remains valid when U, V , Z, Λ are continuous and their
probability mass functions are replaced with probability
density functions, while Bn, En, Fn remain to be discrete
RVs on finite alphabets.
IV. Random permutations whose projections give
two-universal hash functions
Let S1, . . . , ST+1 be finite sets and B =
∏T+1
i=1 Si. In Section
III, we needed a set F of bijective maps from B to itself
such that the uniform random variable F on F gives two-
universal hash functions from B to Si by αI ◦ F, where αI
is the projection from B to ∏i∈I Si. In this section we shall
present two such sets with increasing order of implementation
efficiency.
4
Proposition 14: Suppose that F is the set of all permuta-
tions on B, then αI ◦ F forms a family of two-universal hash
functions for all ∅ , I ⊆ {1, . . . , T + 1}.
Proof. Let x1 , x2 ∈ B. We have |F | = |B|!. On the other hand,
the number of permutations F such that αI(F(x1)) = αI(F(x2))
is given by
|B| × (−1 +
∏
i<I
|Si|) × (|B| − 2)!,
because the number of choices of F(x1) is |B|, the number of
choices of F(x2) given the choice of F(x1) is (−1+∏i<I |Si|),
and the number of choices for values of rest of elements under
F is (|B| − 2)!. Therefore,
Pr[α1(F(x1)) = α1(F(x2))] =
−1 +
∏
i<I |Si|
|B| − 1
≤
1∏
i∈I |Si|
,
which completes the proof.
The above construction can be used with any set B, but
implementation of random permutations is costly. When Si is
a linear space over a finite field Fq, we have a more efficient
implementation.
Lemma 15: Let L be a subgroup of the group of all
bijective linear maps on B. For ~x ∈ B, the orbit O(~x) of ~x
under the action of L is defined by
O(~x) = {L~x | L ∈ L}.
The family of functions {αI ◦ L | L ∈ L} is a family of two-
universal hash functions if and only if
|O(~v) ∩ ({~0} ×∏i<I Si)|
|O(~v)| ≤
1∏
i∈I |Si|
for all ~v ∈ B \ {~0}
Proof. We have
|{L ∈ L | L(~x1 − ~x2) ∈ {~0} ×∏i<I Si}|
|L|
=
|{L ∈ L | L(~x1 − ~x2) ∈ ({~0} ×∏i<I Si)}) \ {~0}|
|{L ∈ L | L(~x1 − ~x2) ∈ O(~x1 − ~x2)}|
=
|O(~x1 − ~x2) ∩ ({~0} ×∏i<I Si)})|
|O(~x1 − ~x2)| .
Renaming ~x1 − ~x2 to ~v proves the lemma.
Proposition 16: If L is the set of all bijective linear maps
on B, then {αI ◦ L | L ∈ L} is a family of two-universal hash
functions.
Proof. For a nonzero ~v ∈ B, we have O(~v) = B \ {~0}, which
implies
|O(~v)| = |B| − 1,
|O(~v) ∩ ({~0} ×
∏
i<I
Si)})| = |B|
|
∏
i∈I Si|
− 1.
By Lemma 15 we can see that the proposition is true.
V. Conclusion
We have presented a coding scheme for the secure multiplex
coding proposed by Yamamoto et al. [8]. Our coding scheme
has two features: (1) evaluation of the mutual information be-
tween Eve’s received signal and a collection of multiple secret
messages, including the convergence speed to the infinity when
the information rates of secret messages are large, and (2)
support for a common message to both Bob and Eve.
We note that we can make the proposed encoder and
decoder universal by replacing the channel code with the
constant composition code used by Körner and Sgarro [10]
as done in [7].
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